Ecological Fiscal Incentives and Spatial Strategic Interactions: The Case of ICMS-E in the state of Paraná

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Abstract

The ICMS-Ecológico is a fiscal transfer mechanism from states to municipalities. Implemented in the early 1990's in Brazil, it aims at rewarding municipalities for the creation and management of protected areas. This paper investigates the efficiency of this mechanism in providing incentives for expanding protected areas in Paraná. We test for the presence of spatial interactions by estimating a spatial tobit model. Estimation results reveal strategic substitutability in conservation decisions by the municipalities.

Keywords: Spatial interactions, Fiscal federalism, Land use.

Resumo

O ICMS-Ecológico é um mecanismo de transferência de recursos fiscais de estados para os municípios. Implementado no ínicio da década de 1990, o mecanismo tem como objetivo compensar municípios pela criação e manutenção de áreas de preservação ambiental. Este artigo investiga a eficiência do ICMS-E no estado do Paraná em gerar incentivos à preservação ambiental. Para se levar em consideração a potencial interação espacial das decisões municipais, estima-se o modelo pelo método Tobit espacial. Os resultados sugerem a existência de substituição estratégica nas decisões de criação de áreas de conservação.

Palavras-chave: interações espaciais, federalismo fiscal, uso da terra.

1   Introduction

Development policies implemented in Brazil until the mid-80's were considered "very aggressive and to the detriment of the environment." However, growing international pressure and the worsening of the economic situation in Brazil led to a change in this in the late 80's (Andersen et al. 2002). Indeed, several programs sprang up with the purpose of promoting sustainable development (see for example Di Bitetti et al. (2003) on biodiversity management and Feres & da Motta (2004) on water management). This change was of the utmost importance since Brazil is recognized as a major reserve of biodiversity. Myers et al. (2000) point out that Brazil is estimated to host one-sixth of the endemic plant species of the Earth, to cite but just one example.

In spite of the federal political will to protect the environment, the state of the biodiversity is mainly influenced by local activities. One solution to protect biodiversity at the local level is the establishment of protected areas. However, protected areas involve both local conservation cost (in terms of land use restrictions) and global conservation benefits. These spatial externalities leads to under-provision of environmental local public goods such as conservation activities (Perrings & Gadgil 2003, Ring 2008b, Barton et al. 2009)[1].

Five mechanisms are widely recognized for internalising spatial externalities and ensuring the provision local public good: prescription, penalties, persuasion, property rights and payments. The main idea is to provide incentives for local actors to engage in conservation efforts for sustainable land use.

Among mechanisms developed to promote sustainable development and urge local actors to produce local public good, the ICMS-Ecologico or ICMS-E ("*Imposto sobre Circulacão de Mercadorias e Servicos - ecológico*" or "*Ecological value added tax*") is of particular interest. It is a fiscal transfer mechanism implemented in order to promote land conservation at the local level. It is not only designed for Amazonian states[2] but also aims at protecting the Atlantic forests. These latter are identified as a biodiversity hotspot and are threatened by fragmentation mainly due to agricultural expansion (see Brooks & Balmford (1996), Brooks et al. (1999) or Putz et al. (2011) for example).

The ICMS-E is an intergovernmental ecological fiscal transfer mechanism from state to municipalities, currently adopted by half of the Brazilian states. It rewards municipalities for the creation of protected areas (namely conservation units, CUs) and watershed reserves. Intergovernmental fiscal transfers are thus used to help in internalizing the problem from the cost side by compensating the municipalities for the foregone economic opportunities, i.e., the opportunity costs of the conservation (Kumar & Managi 2009). Indeed, one reason for its implementation was the demand from municipalities hosting federal or state managed protected areas to be compensated for the opportunity cost of providing this public good. Yet it also aims to act as an incentive to create new protected areas managed at the municipal level.

Since its implementation in the early 90's, the ICMS-E is a real success in terms of CUs creation. In 2000, the areas under protection had already increased by 62.4% in the State of Minas Gerais and by 165% in the State of Paraná (May et al. 2002). Moreover, the mechanism has several interesting features. It is a decentralized system, which imply that decision-makers benefit from a better information, the mechanism is implemented without external source of

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[1] There are few incentives for local actors to encourage local conservation activities when environmental benefits cross local boundaries.

[2] Such as Avança Brasil, for example (Andersen et al. 2002).

financing (the funds redistributed are collected from goods and services tax in the concerned state), at very low transaction cost[3]. This way, it has been claimed that the ICMS-E could be an alternative to other instruments such as pollution permits or pigouvian taxes, notably for the implementation of commitments in international environmental agreements (see Farley et al. (2010)).

Despite its attractiveness, very few studies have been carried out on the ICMS-E. Grieg- Gran (2000) analyzes which municipalities are better off with the ICMS-E reform. She finds mixed evidence. She points out that until 2000, only 60% of the municipalities of Rondonia and Minas Gerais with protected areas benefited from the introduction of the ICMS-Ecológico. Furthermore, May et al. (2002) provide some interesting state level statistics for the Paraná and Minas Gerais states as well as several inspiring case studies[4]. Finally, Ring (2008a) highlights the appeal of the ICMS-E by providing a clear description of the mechanism along with trends and macro level statistics on the creation of CUs in the three states mentioned above.

However, although these three studies are informative and highlight the strengths of the ICMS-E, no one addressed the efficiency of the mechanism. Yet, the ICMS-E is a decentralized policy, and as stated by Oates & Portney (2003), the decentralization of a policy could lead to an inefficient outcome if a race to the bottom between agents in the creation of local public good is observed. However, as we will see in our theoretical part, there are several reasons for expecting municipalities to influence each other when deciding to create CUs or not. Indeed, the interactions between counties can evolve in two directions: the decisions can be substitutes or complements, and the presence of complementarities between decisions can lead to a race to the bottom[5].

Therefore, the aim of this paper is to test one condition for the efficiency of the mechanism, by investigating the presence of interactions between municipalities when they set the propensity of their lands under protection. We collected data on the ICMS-E for 399 municipalities of the state of Paraná from 2000 to 2010. This state constitutes a case of primary interest because it was the first to adopt the considered mechanism in 1991 and a pioneer in introducing a quality-weighting factor for the redistribution of the ICMS-E[6].

This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. We build a new database based on reports released by the IAP (Instituto Ambiental do Paraná). We adapt a land-use model from Chomitz & Gray (1996) to the problematic of setting aside lands for protection and assess its validity through the bayesian spatial tobit estimator proposed by LeSage (1999), LeSage (2000) and LeSage & Pace (2009). The spatial Bayesian tobit model allows us to test the presence of interactions between municipalities in their conservation decisions. Negative spatial interactions between municipalities are found, suggesting that the profitability hypothesis applies and that conservation behavior are strategic substitutes.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the context in which the ICMS-E was implemented in the Brazilian state of Paraná. Section 3 presents the theoretical hypothesis explaining the nature of interactions between municipalities in providing conservation units. Section 4 details the estimation strategy while results are analyzed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes with the possible policy implications.

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[3] According to Vogel (1997), in 1995, in the state of Paraná, 30 million dollars were redistributed to the municipalities for an administrative cost of only 32,000 dollars.
[4] They interviewed several mayors, asking why they used the ICMS-E mechanism.
[5] The terms county and municipality will be used indistinctively in the rest of the paper.
[6] The transparency of system is also an interesting feature in this state since all information concerning the nature of the park, its area and the amount of money received from the ICMS-E by a municipality can be downloaded on the internet.

2 ICMS-E and conservation units in Paraná

2.1 Presentation of the ICMS-E

Brazil is a federal country with 27 states, which capture most of their revenue from tax on the circulation of goods and services, i.e., a value-added tax (VAT), named the ICMS (*Imposto sobre a Circulação de Mercadorias e Servicos*). Brazilian states have to return 25% of their revenue collected from sales taxes to municipalities following certain criteria. Three quarters of this redistribution is defined by the Federal Constitution (the main criterion is the added value created by each municipality), but the Article 158 of the Federal Constitution states that the remaining 25% (i.e., 6.75% of the total) is allocated according to each state's legislation (for instance based on population size or health expenditures).

In 1992, the state of Paraná was the first to introduce ecological criteria in the redistribution of the ICMS-E. The state rewards municipalities for having protected areas (biodiversity) and watershed reserves (water quality) within their boundaries[7]. This pioneering initiative was followed by several states[8] and this new fiscal incentive tool is now called ICMS-Ecológico.

In Paraná, the law implemented awarded 5% of ICMS revenue to municipalities in proportion to their protection of watersheds and conservation areas (also called "conservation units" (CUs)). Half of this (2.5%) is used to reward municipalities for the creation of CUs. These CUs can be publicly managed (federal, state or municipal level), privately owned or managed by public-private partnerships (such as the so-called "*reserva particular do patrimônio natural*", RPPN). It is worth noting that municipalities have no obligation to create and improve protected areas, but are simply rewarded depending on the extent to which they meet the criteria in comparison with other municipalities. Also, since only a fixed pool of money is available in any given year, the municipalities compete with each other to receive the money. The other half (2.5%) is for those municipalities that have watershed protection areas which partly or completely provide services for public drinking water systems in neighboring municipalities[9]. The main motivation of this fiscal redistribution policy was initially to compensate municipalities for the opportunity costs of conservation areas (often decided by the central level, i.e., the state) and for protecting watersheds. But this policy provided significant incentives for the creation of new protected areas which, in turn, allow to increase the number and area of both state and municipal protected areas.

2.2 Evolution of conservation units in Paraná

A brief overview of the evolution of the number of counties in the ICMS-E for all CUs between 2000 and 2010 is given by the Figure 1 in the Appendix. There were 174 counties in the ICMS-E in 2000 compared to 192 in 2010, i.e., receiving funds for the presence of CUs in their territory. The number of counties in the fiscal mechanism has thus increased by 22 in 11 years, while 4 counties have decided to leave the mechanism (i.e., convert their parks for economic uses).

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[7] See May et al. (2002, p.175) for a more complete presentation of the law making process in Paraná.

[8] Fourteen Brazilian states have already introduced the ICMS-E, including São Paulo (1996), Minas Gerais (1996), Rondonia (1996), Amapá (1996), Rio Grande do Sul (1998), Mato Grosso (2001), Mato Grosso do Sul (2001), Pernambuco (2001), Tocantins (2002) (see the official website of the ICMS-E, http ://www.icmsecologico.org.br/, and Verssimo et al. (2002), Ring (2008*a*))

[9] See, for instance, the case of the municipality of Piraquara which have 10% of its territory covered by protected areas for biodiversity conservation and the remaining 90% used for conserving a major watershed to supply the Curitiba metropolitan region (1.5 million inhabitants) with drinking water (May et al. 2002, Ring 2008*a*).

As stated before, in our analysis, we focus only on the creation of parks managed at the municipal level. Therefore, as shown by Figure 2 (see appendix), the number of counties which have received funds for the creation of municipal parks has increased by 9 counties between 2000 and 2010 (57 in 2000 compared to 66 in 2010) over the 399 counties in the dataset. In consequence, respectively 342 and 333 counties did not receive fiscal transfers from the ICMS-E for the creation of municipal CUs in 2000 and 2010. Moreover, it is worth noting that 4 counties no longer received funds from the ICMS-E, i.e., they converted municipal CUs for economic uses during the last decade, while 13 new counties received funds from ICMS-E for the creation of their first municipal CUs.

Further, as we can see in Table 1, the average size of the area of municipal parks by county is about 1171 hectares in 2010, representing in average 2 percent of the municipality area. By comparison, the federal and state managed parks covered about 8141 hectares in average by county (9 percents of the total municipal area).

[insert Table 1 here]

Finally, Figure 3 shows the evolution of the area of all CUs in hectare at the state level[10]. It is found that the evolution of CUs can be divided into two periods. In the first decade, the creation of CUs increased sharply, while in the last decade (from 2000), the creation of CUs is found to increase more reasonably. From this, it can be assumed that the level of created CUs in the state of Paraná through the ICMS-E mechanism has reached a kind of stationary level.

3 Analytical framework

3.1 Why testing for the presence of interactions between conservation decision ?

As pointed by Barton et al. (2009), ecological fiscal transfers such as the ICMS-Ecologico *"provide an interesting and rather new case for comparative analysis on the effectiveness and efficiency of biodiversity conservation instrument."* Therefore, and as explained in the introduction, the aim of this work is to contribute to this area of research, by testing one condition for the efficiency (defined in terms of parks creation) of the ICMS-E[11].

The ICMS-E is a decentralized fiscal transfer mechanism from states to municipalities. Yet, as stated by Oates (see for instance Oates & Portney (2003)), one condition for an efficient decentralization is the absence of interactions between agents. With respect to the ICMS-E, this point was first underlined by Ring (2008a): *"Despite the general suitability of many land-use issues for being assigned to lower governmental levels, spatial externalities may require different, more appropriate solutions."* Indeed, the mechanism would be inefficient, if for example, a race to the bottom in park-creation decision is observed, leading to a low overall level of protected area in the state. Testing the nature of (horizontal) interaction between municipalities' decision is therefore crucial to assess the efficiency of the mechanism[12].

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[10] Of course, these figures concern all CUs, i.e., federal, state and municipal CUs whereas only the evolution of municipal CUs created is of interest in our study. Unfortunately, we do not have reliable data on the creation of municipal CU's before 2000

[11] Indeed, we define here efficiency in relation to the main goal of the mechanism, which is the creation of protected areas in order to preserve biodiversity. Other definition of efficiency could be in term of avoided deforestation in the overall state for example, but it is beyond the scope of this paper.

[12] See Fredriksson & Millimet (2002) for an other example of test for the presence of horizontal interactions in the case of environmental criteria.

3.2   What is the likely nature of these interactions?

In reality, the interactions between a county and its neighbors can evolve in two directions. On the one hand, the level of parks in a county and one of its neighbors could be strategic complements. On the other hand, the level of parks in a county and one of its neighbors could be strategic substitutes. Indeed, there exist arguments for both situations, which will be discussed in the following paragraphs. To develop and present our arguments, we consider, that with a given plot, the municipality can choose between two options: *protected* area or *unprotected* area. The first option means the creation of a municipal park whereas the second one refers to the development of economic activities (industry, agriculture, logging,...) on the plot.

A strategic complementarity in municipalities' conservation decisions would mean that a county has an interest to follow the decision of its neighbor. For instance, it means that the utility gained from the creation of a park increases (decreases) if the neighbor is creating more (less) protected areas. This could be motivated by three main reasons. First, according to the Tiebout theory of voting with the feet (Tiebout 1956), a new firm could choose the municipality where the environmental standards are lower to settle down. This way, it could lead to a race to the bottom between municipality if ever they want to attract the firm. Second, if we think about the strategy of a peasant, this latter could choose the county where its potential development is the higher (where there is less protected areas). Therefore this could lead the municipalities to compete again on this criterion. Finally, as pointed by Andam (2007), the establishment of protected areas in a county can lessen the development of local market infrastructure such as transport ones. It could then reduce the profitability of an economic activity in neighboring municipalities, which cannot enjoy these infrastructures. The spillovers from the creation of a park in one municipality can then be positive and induce the creation of a park in the neighboring municipality[13].

However, if we think in terms of the profitability of the two options, development of economic activities or creation of parks, we could also expect the decisions to be strategic substitutes. It could come through four channels. First, the creation of a protected area in one municipality could constrain the economic activity and lead to a worker surplus in this municipality. The displacement of the worker surplus to the neighboring municipality will put down the wage level and favor the economic activity compared to the protection option. Second, the creation of new CUs decreases the stock of lands available for economic production in a municipality. Therefore, it increases the demand of lands for economic production in the neighboring municipalities. Depending on the relative profits from economic activities, these latter could be incited to increase their supply of land for economic activities (by decreasing their number of CUs), in order to attract peasants and firms when its neighbor is decreasing its supply. We could therefore, in this case again, expect protection decisions to be strategic substitutes. Moreover, we could think of an effect traditionally highlighted in studies on deforestation leakages. The creation of a park in a municipality will decrease the availability of the wood resource in this municipality and then increase the logging in the neighboring municipalities. The creation of parks in a municipality will therefore go along the destruction of protected areas or the reduction of incentives to create new ones, in the neighboring municipalities. Finally, a protected area is also a public good that local population can enjoy. Yet, the distance between two municipalities is relatively small, and the citizens from one municipality could go to the neighboring municipality to enjoy the recreation of a park. A municipality could then decide to free ride and create less parks if the neighboring municipalities are providing this local public good.

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[13] . Or the other way around, the development of infrastructures can exacerbate the deforestation (see for example Pfaff (1999)).

Considering the arguments exposed above, we could expect conservation decisions to be strategic substitutes or strategic complements. The following section 4 will deal with the empirical strategy implemented in order to raise the right answer.

4 Empirical strategy

4.1 Econometric model and data used

To estimate the presence of interactions between municipalities in their conservation decisions, we borrow the methodology used in the tax-competition and public spending literature (see for example Case et al. (1993), Brueckner (2003) or Lockwood & Migali (2009)). We estimate a Spatial AutoRegressive (SAR) model, where the spatially lagged endogenous variable is a weighted sum of neighbors' decisions, such as :

$$P^* = \rho W P^* + \beta X + \varepsilon \qquad (1)$$

where P^* is a $N \times 1$ vector of the propensity to create a municipal CUs by a county. N is the number of municipalities in the sample, here 399. X is a M x N matrix of our M explanatory variables influencing the choice between the protected and unprotected options and β is the vector of their corresponding coefficients. The term ε is a $N \times 1$ vector of residuals. WP^* is a spatially lagged endogenous variable, where W is a $N \times N$ contiguity matrix of which each element w_{jk} takes the value of 1 if two counties share a common border, and 0 otherwise (where j identifies a municipality different from municipality k). Hence, ρ capture the presence of interactions between municipalities.

The dependent variable is latent, i.e., cannot be observed for $p^* < 0$. Indeed, there is a large number of zero observations in our sample. In 2010, 342 municipalities over 399 do not create municipal CUs. It is hard to think that each municipality is in exactly the same situation. We can therefore argue that censoring is at stake and that there exist negative profits unmeasured by our dependent variable. Therefore, we have:

$$p_{j,t} = 0 \quad if \quad p^*_{j,t} \leq 0$$
$$p_{j,t} = p^*_{j,t} \quad otherwise,$$

where $p_{j,t}$ is the observed dependent variable. Following the traditional approach in land use studies, initiated by Chomitz & Gray (1996), we account for this censoring using a tobit model, where the conditional distribution of $p_{j,t}$ given all other parameters is a truncated normal distribution, constructed by truncating distribution from the left at 0.

The expanded form of the spatial autoregressive tobit models is the following one:

$$p_j^* = \rho \sum_{j \neq k}^{J} w_{jk} p_k^* + \beta p_j^{init} + \delta FED_j + \alpha_1 ind_j + \alpha_2 agr_j + \alpha_3 inc_j$$
$$+ \quad \alpha_4 incsq_j + \alpha_5 pop_j + \alpha_6 urb_j + \alpha_7 rur_j + \alpha_8 Curitiba + \mu_r + \vartheta_i,$$

where the observed dependent variable, p_j, is the logarithm of $ICMS\text{-}E$ transfers to county j in 2010 and p^{init} represent the initial transfers in 2000 (also in log). This latter is introduced to take into account the initial conditions determined by the first period of implementation of the mechanism.

All other variables are control ones and are assumed to have an impact on the land allocation decision-rule. First, variable FED_j refers to transfers related to the existence of CUs created by other administrative levels (federal and state CUs) in the county j in 2010. This variable can have both a negative and positive expected effects. Given that the area of a county is by definition fixed, more non-municipal CUs increases the scarcity of the land. In this context, the effect of the land allocation decision is ambiguous. First, the creation of federal or state level protected areas could decrease the amount of land to be potentially converted into municipal conservation areas. FED_j would therefore have a negative effect on p_j. However, assume that the land scarcity increases the land price. This pushes the economic agent to not invest in this county since the cost for unprotected option goes up. The municipality knowing that can decide to protect the land and create a CUs to earn more money from the ICMS-E.

Variables ind_j and agr_j are respectively the average ratio of the industrial GDP on the total municipal GDP between 2000 and 2008, and the average ratio of the agricultural GDP on the total municipal GDP between 2000 and 2008. These variables measure the development projects and are assumed to increase the opportunity cost of creating conservations units. They are thus negatively linked to the propensity to create municipal parks.

Variable inc_j corresponds to the log of annual average GDP per capita between 2000 and 2008. The effect of the variable inc_j could be ambiguous since richer counties could be better off preserving their forests for ornamental purposes. To test this idea, the quadratic term in log ($incsq_j$) is used. Thus, (1) poorer counties are assumed to be more inclined to create parks since their comparative advantages to proceed in unprotected activities are lower than richer counties, and (2) richer counties are also assumed to create more parks for ornamental aims. The quadratic term $incsq_j$ is thus assumed to be negative, i.e., the income effect on the creation of parks is U-unversed.

pop_j, urb_j and rur_j are respectively the average annual population growth, urban density (per km^2) and rural density (per km^2) between 2000-2010. These variables are proxies for labor supply and are expected to have a negative effect on p_j.

Curitiba is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 for the capital of Paraná and 0 otherwise, therefore controlling for the strong differences of the capital city compared to the

others. Indeed, there is a real political will from Curitiba to be a green city[14,15].

μ_r is a micro-region dummy representing a legally defined administrative area consisting of groups of municipalities bordering urban areas. This dummy allows to check for unobserved fixed effects shared by same neighboring counties. In the state of Paraná, there are 39 micro-regions.

Data concerning CUs (p_j, p_j^{init} and FED_j) are taken from ICMS-E official website[16]. All other variables come from the IPEADATA[20] (see Tables 1 and 2 in appendix for more information on descriptive statistics).

4.2   Estimator

The estimation of parameters from spatial autoregressive tobit model represent a computational challenge and cannot be done via analytic methods. Indeed, it is impossible to use maximum likelihood due to multiple integrals in the likelihood function. Therefore, the econometrician must turn to simulation methods, such as EM algorithm or bayesian estimation. We choose to rely here on the bayesian approach developed by LeSage (1999), LeSage (2000), LeSage & Pace (2009) and applied by Autant-Bernard & LeSage (2011), due to its computational simplicity and the possibility to easily take into account of heteroscedasticity in the error terms[17].

In this approach, the model parameters are estimated via MCMC (Monte Carlo Markov Chain) procedure, with a chosen number of *n* draws, such as estimator convergence is achieved. The mean of the distribution of parameters estimated at each draw will then be used as parameters values in the displayed results. Furthermore, the unobserved negative profits associated with the censored 0 observations are considered as parameters to estimate. The procedure uses the Geweke m-steps Gibbs sampler to produce draws from a multivariate truncated normal distribution in order to generate the unobserved negative profits associated with the censored 0 observations[18,19].

Finally, since the adopted approach has been developed recently, none test exist to identify the presence of a spatial lag prior to the estimation or to check for the presence of spatial correlation in the error terms. However, in the preliminary analysis, we run the LM Robust tests for spatial lag and for spatial error after an OLS regression developed by Anselin et al. (1996). They indicated the presence of a spatial lag, and the absence of spatial error correlation.

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[14] . Note that the 2011 report from UN-Habitat quoted Jaime Lemer the mayor of Curitiba : "The city is not the problem, its the solution. And its a solution for the problem of climate change."

[15] In a standard cross section, it would be akin to drop the observation. However, it is different in a SAR model, since the municipality behavior influences the other decision through the spatially lagged endogenous variable.

[16] Data downloadable on the ICMS-E website http ://www.icmsecologico.org.br/.

[17] Note that Albers et al. (2008) faced a similar problem and adopted a similar solution, when studying the interactions between private and public parks creation in the United States

[18] The m-steps correspond to the number of draws use to generate the unobserved negative profits, realized at each n draw. Following LeSage & Pace (2009), considering our sample size(N=399), we choose m=10 even if it could be relatively computationally challenging.

[19] In addition, to produce estimates that will be robust in the presence of non-constant variance of dis- turbances (heteroscedasticity) and outliers, it is assumed that, in the development of the Gibbs sampler, the hyperparameter *r*, that determines the extent to which the disturbances take on a leptokurtic character, is stated at 4 as suggested by LeSage (1999).

4.3   Interpretation of the coefficients estimated

Coefficients from a SAR model cannot be interpreted directly. Indeed there is an implicit form behind the model presented in equation (1). It can be rewritten as:

$$P^* - \rho WP^* = \beta X + \varepsilon \qquad (2)$$

$$P^* (I_N - \rho W) = \beta X + \varepsilon \qquad (3)$$

$$P^* = (I_N - \rho W)^{-1}\beta X + (I_N - \rho W)^{-1} \varepsilon \qquad (4)$$

To interpret the coefficients of a spatial model, the researcher has to calculate the direct impact of a variable, its indirect impact and the total impact (equal to the direct impact plus the indirect one). Indeed, a change on an explanatory variable in a particular region will affect the p^* value of this region (direct impact), but also the other regions because of the spatial spillovers (the indirect impact). Computation details of these impacts are described in (LeSage & Pace 2009, p.33-39).

Finally, note that estimated coefficients from the Tobit model are not the marginal effects of each explanatory variable on the observed dependent variable. Therefore we can interpret the sign of the direct and indirect effects but not their magnitude.

5   Results

5.1   Neighboring effects and conservation unit creation

We estimated the influence of neighbors decision as well as several economic indicators on the propensity of creating parks by a municipality. The Biodiversity Conservation coefficient used by the state of Paraná to redistribute the ICMS-E is used as dependent variable. In all regressions, the contiguity spatial weight matrix is used to represent the prior strength between two municipalities. Our results come from the estimation of a baysesian spatial tobit model using 1 step in the gibbs sampler and 1000 draws in the MCMC procedure [26]. Our main results are presented in Table 3, where the first column present the value of the coefficients (β), the second column the value of the direct impact of the explanatory variable, the third column the indirect impact and the fourth the total impact.

[insert Table 3 here]

Negative spatial interactions between counties are found ($\rho < 0$) suggesting that a county is more inclined to create municipal CUs if their neighboring counties decrease the number of their CUs. This way, this result points out that the hypothesis of profitability, predicted by the theoretical model, seems to be at stake in the choice of creating municipal CUs in the state of Paraná between 2000 and 2010. This way, it is more profitable for a county to convert its natural land for agricultural or industrial activities if their neighboring counties have preferred to create CUs and be awarded by the ICMS-E. The design of the ICMS-E is an explanation of these behaviors since the pool of money is fixed, thus leading a county to not be incited to enter into the mechanism and so to be more inclined to convert its natural land for economic purposes. This result could explain the stable trend in the creation of municipal CUs in the last decade

after a strong upward trend in the first years of the implementation of the ICMS-E. Concerning the other economic factors assumed to have an effect on the land allocation rule-decision of a county (through their effects on the differential profit between land uses option), the population variables have the expected negative coefficient but are not significant. Moreover, the structure of the county's economy is found to be important to explain the propensity to create municipal CUs. In fact, the more the share of agriculture is important in the municipal activities, the less the propensity to create municipal CUs. This result points out the role of economic activities in the propensity to create CUs. More developed counties in terms of agricultural activities can be more encouraged to develop their activities to earn money from the ICMS which awards counties on the basis of their created value added. Besides, the Table 3 provides the estimated direct, indirect and total effects of each explanatory variable. Recall that direct impact can be interpreted as a marginal impact, the indirect one as a spatial spillover effect and total one as a summary measure of the total impact associated with changes in each explanatory variable. All significant effects previously presented (for population growth and the weight of agriculture and industry) are found to be mainly direct effects. However, we observe indirect effect of lower magnitude and of the opposite sign, which is due to the substitutable nature of conservation decisions.

5.2   Robustness checks

5.2.1   Taking only account of the size of protected areas

As our first robustness check, we use a different measure of the environmental performance of a county. Indeed, the Municipal Conservation Factor used to redistribute the ICMS-E is equal to the ratio of protected areas on total area of a county, weighted by a measure of the intensivity of the protection, the "quality factor". We choose to use only the ratio of protected areas on total land - the quantity ratio - as dependent variable. This will allow us to check the robustness of our first result (the substitutability in conservation decisions) and to see is the driving forces tested influence the way a country choose to improve its protection of land (i.e., in an intensive or extensive manner). Table 4 presents results for the quantity ratio as dependent variable.

[insert Table 4 here]

Negative spatial interactions between counties are also found, thus confirming the negative effects of neighboring counties on the propensity to create CUs for a county. Concerning the other economic factors, the negative effects of agricultural is still found suggesting that counties whom the economy is more base on agriculture are less prone to increase their level of CUs. Finally, the density of urban population is now a factor which threat protection. It is worthy to notice that this factor have an effect on the extensive component of protection, but no longer when it is weighed by the intensivity of the protection. Concerning the indirect effects (spatial externalities), two variables have a significant effect. First is the negative initial level of quality (in 2000) suggesting that the more was the initial level of neighbors, the less the propensity for the county to increase the quality of its CUs. The second significant indirect impact is the positive effect of agriculture. Thus, the greater the weight of agriculture in the neighbors of a municipality, the greater the propensity to create CUs in this county.

5.2.2   Checking the consistency of the estimator

Since the bayesian spatial tobit is a new estimator and that few researchers have applied it, we provide several robustness tests on the estimator itself. Indeed, to our knowledge, it have been proposed in the article of LeSage (2000) and the manuals of LeSage (1999) and LeSage & Pace

(2009), but to the best of our knowledge, have only been applied in Autant-Bernard & LeSage (2011).

The following regressions are run with different number of m-steps ($m=1$, $m=10$ or $m=20$) of the Gibbs sampler process and different number of draws (n=1,000; 10,000). Robustness tests are made on the estimation procedure since the main computational challenge using a Bayesian framework is the state of some parameters such as the number of draws or the number of m-step used in the computation of the estimated negative utilities for the censored observations of the dependent variable (LeSage & Pace 2009).

The first robustness check on the number of steps in the Gibbs sampler process, aims at testing the accuracy of the computed vector of parameters which replaces the unobserved latent utility The second test consists in increasing the number of draws and comparing the inferences based on a smaller set of draws (here n=1,000) to those resulting from a larger set of draws (here n=10,000) in order to evaluate the stability in the parameter values found. The basic assumption is that if the inferences are identical, then the estimator can be assumed to be consistent.

Tables 5 provide results with the MCF coefficients as dependent variable for respectively 1, 10 and 20 steps of the Gibbs sampler process, with 1,000 and 10,000 draws . The spatial interactions are still found to be negative and significant as are the urban density, the agricultural ratio and the industrial one. The level of created CUs in 2000 is found to have a significant and negative indirect effect suggesting the presence of negative neighboring effects on the propensity to create CUs. Also, urban density is now found to have a significant positive indirect effect. This reinforces the role of urban density in the decision to create CUs. If the neighbor of a county has a strong urban density, the propensity to create CUs in this county will be stronger since this county could expect that its neighbor is not inclined to create CUs.

[insert table 5 here]

6   Conclusion

The aim of this paper was to assess the efficiency of the ICMS-E by testing the presence of strategic interactions between Brazilian counties in the state of Paraná. It is a fiscal transfer from the state to municipalities on the basis of the performance of each county in the creation and management of CUs. This way, the ICMS-E can be viewed as a Payment for Environmental Services (PES).

This fiscal scheme is important since it is a form of PES which can be implemented without external source of financing and at very low transaction costs. However, since the system is decentralized, its efficiency could be threatened by the presence of interactions between municipalities when they decide to set their lands aside for protection.

Therefore, this study tries to investigate if the behavior of neighboring counties in terms of created municipal CUs has an effect on the propensity for a county to create municipal CUs between 2000 and 2010 in the state of Paraná. The choice of the time-span analysis is motivated by the availability of data but is interesting due to the fact that, in this period, the level of created CUs seems to have reached a stationary level after a strong upward trend in the first decade of the implementation of the ICMS-E (1992-2000).

From a land use model and a spatial autoregressive Bayesian tobit model, the results suggest the presence of negative spatial interactions between counties. These negative spatial externalities

can be explained by the hypothesis of profitability which states that the county will choose the use which maximizes its profit. In our case a municipality will prefer to develop economic activities, to attract peasants and firms from a neighbor who have decided to create CUs. The fact that in the ICMS-E a fixed pool of money is shared between counties explain and strengthen this effect.

The results do not highlight a race to the bottom between counties which would have finally questioned the efficiency of the ICMS-E. However, we observe strategic substitutability between conservation decisions which seems to lead the mechanism to reach an equilibrium. In a way, the mechanism seems to be efficient, because this result suggests that the behavior of municipalities is driven by an optimization process and that they integrate the decision of their neighbors in their calculus.

However, remark that there is no reason for the shared pool of money to lead to the optimal level of land set aside for protection. Moreover, it seems that municipalities do not intend to provide a public good but are more subject to a profitability calculus. This way, the design of the ICMS-E, via the definition of the quality weighting factor, seems crucial.

To conclude, the ICMS-E has had great success and has allowed to increase the number of CUs in Paraná. This experience should be viewed as a new and interesting tool to finance local public good without external funding, but being aware of the potential negative spatial interactions which can occur.

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7   Appendix

Figure 1 – Evolution of the number of counties in the ICMS-E

```
                        Number of
                        counties : 399

        ICMS-E in 2000 :                      Not in ICMS-E in
             174                                 2000 : 225

ICMS-E in 2010 :    Not in ICMS-E in     ICMS-E in 2010 :    not ICMS-E in
     170              2010 : 4                 22             2010 : 203
```

Note : Evolutions between 2000 and 2010 of the number of counties concerning by the ICMS-E, whatever the CUs.

Figure 2 – Evolution of the number of counties in the ICMS-E for municipal CUs

```
                        Number of
                        counties : 399

        ICMS-E in 2000 :                      Not in ICMS-E in
              57                                 2000 : 342

ICMS-E in 2010 :    Not in ICMS-E in     ICMS-E in 2010 :    not ICMS-E in
      53              2010 : 4                 13             2010 : 329
```

Note : Evolutions between 2000 and 2010 of the number of counties concerning by the ICMS-E for the creation of municipal CUs.

Figure 3 – Evolution of the creation of all CUs in Paraná between 1991 and 2010

Note : Evolution of the areas (in hectare) of all conservation units (federal, state and municipal) between 2000 and 2010.

Table 1 – Summary statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Municipal CU	1171.669	3665.868	1.4	22760
Ratio of Municipal CU on total area	0.021	0.056	0	0.218
N		66		
Federal and state CU	10030.03	24534.685	1.72	213265.203
Ratio of Federal and state CU on total area	0.107	0.189	0	0.988
N		165		

Notes : Conservation Units (CU) are measured in hectares, for the year 2010.

Table 2 – Summary statistics

Variable	Mean	(Std. Dev.)	Min.	Max.	N
CUs ratio (2010)	0.0034	(0.0238)	0	0.2175	399
Coefficient quality (2010)	0.0018	(0.009)	0	0.1272	399
CUs ratio (2000)	0.0018	(0.0156)	0	0.1993	399
Coefficient quality (2000)	0.0013	(0.0093)	0	0.1695	399
CUs ratio (Federal, State) 2010	0.0444	(0.1322)	0	0.9876	399
Coefficient quality (Federal, State) 2010	0.0135	(0.0386)	0	0.3254	399
Agricultural GDP/GDP	0.3051	(0.1484)	0.0004	0.6235	399
Industrial GDP/GDP	0.1439	(0.1148)	0.0288	0.8336	399
GDP	5.647	3.305	(2.278)	42.817	399
GDP squared	42.786	(105.342)	5.189	1833.269	399
Population growth	2.2483	(11.7301)	-38.4769	73.3038	399
Urban population density	51.1113	(233.5605)	0.8544	3918.803	399
Rural population density	9.4345	(10.9149)	0	192.9066	399

Source : Authors' calculation.

Table 3 – Spatial interactions and MCF

	Dependent variable : MCF 2010			
n=1000, m=1				
Variable	Coefficient	*Direct*	*Indirect*	*Total*
ρ	-0.007961**			
	(0.015)			
MCF2000	2.147355***	2.159819***	-0.017943**	2.141876***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.036)	(0.000)
FED2010	0.046348	0.04671	-0.000395	0.046315
	(0.408)	(0.417)	(0.502)	(0.417)
pop	-0.000087	-0.000099	0.000001	-0.000098
	(0.732)	(0.718)	(0.724)	(0.718)
agr	-0.120156***	-0.121699***	0.001038*	-0.120661***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.071)	(0.000)
ind	-0.045715	-0.046228	0.0004	-0.045827
	(0.130)	(0.129)	(0.273)	(0.129)
inc	0.007792	0.007482	-0.000067	0.007415
	(0.763)	(0.773)	(0.790)	(0.773)
incsq	-0.002343	-0.00224	0.00002	-0.00222
	(0.699)	(0.714)	(0.744)	(0.714)
rur	-0.000506	-0.000507	0.000004	-0.000503
	(0.193)	(0.212)	(0.317)	(0.212)
urb	-0.000005	-0.000005	-0.000000	-0.000005
	(0.738)	(0.725)	(0.739)	(0.725)
Curitiba	-0.22267***	-0.223891***	0.001851*	-0.22204***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.080)	(0.004)
intercept	-0.033999			
	(0.277)			

Notes : ***=significant at the 1 percent level, **=significant at the 5 percent level, *=significant at the 10 percent level. p-values associated to the reported coefficients are in parentheses. n correspond to the number of draws and m to the number of steps in the gibbs sampler. We allow for heteroscedasticity in the error terms by setting the value of the hyperparameter r to 4.

Table 4 – Spatial interactions and CUs ratio

	Dependent variable : CUs ratio in 2010			
n=1000, m=1				
Variable	Coefficient	*Direct*	*Indirect*	*Total*
ρ	-0.015591**			
	(0.049)			
ratiom2000	2.496689***	2.50393***	-0.042608*	2.461322***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.055)	(0.000)
ratioFED2010	0.002393	0.001981	-0.000046	0.001935
	(0.917)	(0.930)	(0.920)	(0.931)
pop	-0.000238	-0.000225	0.000004	-0.000221
	(0.424)	(0.448)	(0.532)	(0.447)
agr	-0.158445***	-0.157292***	0.002696*	-0.154596***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.080)	(0.000)
ind	-0.06142**	-0.059479**	0.001014	-0.058464**
	(0.039)	(0.049)	(0.204)	(0.049)
inc	-0.00736	-0.009311	0.000168	-0.009144
	(0.781)	(0.730)	(0.743)	(0.731)
incsq	0.002291	0.002695	-0.00005	0.002646
	(0.720)	(0.676)	(0.686)	(0.677)
rur	-0.000265	-0.000301	0.000004	-0.000296
	(0.448)	(0.417)	(0.510)	(0.417)
urb	-0.00015***	-0.00015***	0.000003*	-0.000148***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.065)	(0.000)
Curitiba	0.269058***	0.269791***	-0.004644*	0.265147***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.089)	(0.000)
intercept	0.033778			
	(0.310)			

*Notes : ***=significant at the 1 percent level, **=significant at the 5 percent level, *=significant at the 10 percent level. p-values associated to the reported coefficients are in parentheses. n correspond to the number of draws and m to the number of steps in the gibbs sampler. We allow for heteroscedasticity in the error terms by setting the value of the hyperparameter r to 4.*

Table 5 – Consistency tests

	Dependent variable : MCF 2010					
m=	1		10		20	
n=	1000	10000	1000	10000	1000	10000
Variable						
ρ	-0.007961**	-0.005395**	-0.0093**	-0.00786**	-0.009105***	-0.00481*
	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.029)	(0.001)	(0.075)
MCF2000	2.147355***	2.083261***	2.0062***	2.03212***	2.035416***	2.095744***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
FED2010	0.046348	0.048372	0.0476	0.049377	0.040812	0.042334
	(0.408)	(0.361)	(0.299)	(0.332)	(0.408)	(0.418)
pop	-0.000087	-0.000195	-0.000000	-0.000111	-0.000000	-0.000122
	(0.732)	(0.435)	(0.827)	(0.652)	(0.999)	(0.623)
agr	-0.120156***	-0.120498***	-0.0978***	-0.110865***	-0.103823***	-0.112345***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
ind	-0.045715	-0.047154	-0.0404	-0.044297	-0.047554*	-0.043165
	(0.130)	(0.101)	(0.106)	(0.106)	(0.068)	(0.127)
inc	0.007792	0.009978	0.0067	0.009938	0.012694	0.009026
	(0.763)	(0.711)	(0.776)	(0.697)	(0.593)	(0.723)
incsq	-0.002343	-0.00256	-0.0023	-0.002748	-0.003612	-0.002489
	(0.699)	(0.681)	(0.675)	(0.646)	(0.517)	(0.680)
rur	-0.000506	-0.00033	-0.0005	-0.000368	-0.000469	-0.000372
	(0.193)	(0.310)	(0.210)	(0.279)	(0.174)	(0.305)
urb	-0.000005	-0.000005	-0.000000	-0.000005	-0.000006	-0.000005
	(0.738)	(0.697)	(0.686)	(0.714)	(0.626)	(0.709)
Curitiba	-0.22267***	-0.208601***	-0.2005***	-0.20258***	-0.200199***	-0.211293***
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.004)
intercept	-0.033999	-0.028195	-0.0258	-0.036568	-0.029702	-0.028634
	(0.277)	(0.424)	(0.373)	(0.266)	(0.360)	(0.395)

Notes : ***=significant at the 1 percent level, **=significant at the 5 percent level, *=significant at the 10 percent level. p-values associated to the reported coefficients are in parentheses. n correspond to the number of draws and m to the number of steps in the gibbs sampler. We allow for heteroscedasticity in the error terms by setting the value of the hyperparameter *r* to 4.